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Abstract
In the design of incentive compatible mechanisms, a com-
mon approach is to enforce incentive compatibility as con-
straints in programs that optimize over feasible mechanisms.
Such constraints are often imposed on sparsified representa-
tions of the type spaces, such as their discretizations or sam-
ples, in order for the program to be manageable. In this work,
we explore limitations of this approach, by studying whether
all dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms on a
set T of discrete types can be extended to the convex hull
of T .
Dobzinski, Fu and Kleinberg (2015) answered the question
affirmatively for all settings where types are single dimen-
sional. It is not difficult to show that the same holds when the
set of feasible outcomes is downward closed. In this work we
show that the question has a negative answer for certain non-
downward-closed settings with multi-dimensional types. This
result should call for caution in the use of the said approach to
enforcing incentive compatibility beyond single-dimensional
preferences and downward closed feasible outcomes.
Introduction
Mechanism design studies optimization problems with pri-
vate inputs from strategic agents. An agent’s input, known as
her type, is her private information including her valuation
for the social outcomes, which are to be decided upon by the
mechanism. A mechanism needs to solicit such information
to achieve certain goals, e.g. maximizing welfare, revenue,
surplus or fairness measures. It needs to provide its partici-
pants with correct incentives, via both social outcomes and
payments, so that the agents find it in their best interests to
reveal their types.
Dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC) is one
of the strongest and most widely used solution concepts that
guarantee such incentives. Under DSIC, every participant,
no matter what type she possesses and no matter what types
the other participants report to the mechanism, will maxi-
mize her utility by revealing her true type. Not only is this a
strong guarantee for the mechanism designer that true infor-
mation should be reported and optimized over, it also allevi-
ates the burden of strategizing from the participating agents
— telling truth is a dominant strategy regardless of the other
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agents’ types or strategies. Partly thanks to this strong incen-
tive guarantee, the two fundamental auctions, namely, the
VCG auction that maximizes social welfare (Vickrey 1961;
Clarke 1971; Groves 1973), and Myerson’s auction that
maximizes expected revenue for selling a single item (My-
erson 1981), have been foundational in both the theory and
practice of mechanism design.
As the scope of mechanism design expands beyond the
classical settings, incentive compatible mechanisms that are
optimal for various objective often lack the simple struc-
tures that characterize the VCG and Myerson’s mechanisms.
By and large, there have been two approaches to the design
of incentive compatible mechanisms. The first approach fo-
cuses on classes of mechanisms that, by their simple struc-
tures, have obvious incentive guarantees. For example, in
a multi-item auction, a sequential pricing mechanism puts
prices on items and asks each agent in turn to choose her
favorite items that remain; the bidders are not asked about
their values, and choosing utility-maximizing items (accord-
ing to their true values) is the obvious strategy to adopt
(see, e.g., Chawla et al. 2010; Chawla, Malec, and Sivan
2010; Feldman, Gravin, and Lucier 2015). Another example
is to optimize over parameterized “VCG-like” mechanisms
which inherit incentive properties from the VCG mechanism
(e.g. Sandholm and Likhodedov 2015). This approach is of-
ten used to search for mechanisms whose performance is a
factor away from being optimal, since the optimal mecha-
nism or its very close approximations are often not within
the class of mechanisms being searched over.
The second approach forgoes structures that are easily in-
terpretable, and exhaustively searches for the optimal mech-
anism. This is exemplified by solving mathematical pro-
grams (typically linear or convex programs) whose feasible
regions contain the set of all incentive compatible mech-
anisms (see, e.g. Conitzer and Sandholm 2002; Dobzin-
ski, Fu, and Kleinberg 2015; Daskalakis, Deckelbaum, and
Tzamos 2017;Feng and Hartline 2018). Typically, incentive
requirements are hardwired as constraints in such programs.
Difficulty arises in the second approach when one would
like to adopt strong incentive guarantees such as DSIC,
which need at least one constraint per profile of types to
specify. When the space of possible types is a continuum,
this gives rise to uncountably many constraints. While this
does not always make the program impossible to solve it
considerably complicates the task. One way to work around
this is to discretize the type space and only impose incentive
compatible (IC) constraints on the set of discrete types used
to represent the type space. Discretization is also embodied
in the idea of a given prior distribution over a set of discrete
types, on which the optimization can then be based (e.g.
Conitzer and Sandholm 2002; Dobzinski, Fu, and Kleinberg
2015). The most common motivation for such prior distribu-
tions is that they naturally result from samples (e.g. from
past observations or market research) from an underlying
distribution, whereas the true distribution may be supported
on a continuum of types. This approach motivates the ques-
tion we study in this work.
Questions we study. In this work we aim to answer the
question: when one has a mechanism that is DSIC on a dis-
cretized subset of a type space, can one always find a mech-
anism that has the same behavior on the subset and yet is
DSIC on the whole type space? To make the question more
concrete, we study the natural case where the whole type
space is the convex hull of the discrete subset. To make the
presentation easier, in the following we denote by T the dis-
crete subset of types, and Conv(T ) its convex hull.
We consider the question a fundamental one for the sec-
ond approach to mechanism design that we described above.
When one optimizes for a mechanism with IC constraints
imposed only on T , if the resulting mechanism cannot be
extended to the original type space, it loses incentive guar-
antees when put to use.
One objection may be that, given a mechanism that is
DSIC on T , one may always run it on Conv(T ), by restrict-
ing the “bidding language”, so that a type in Conv(T ) but
not in T has to report a type in T . Such mechanisms, how-
ever, may lose the incentive guarantee which makes DSIC
mechanisms attractive in the first place. Unless one can show
that agents with types not in T have a dominant strategy in
such mechanisms, such agents need to strategize over which
types in T to report, depending on the types and strate-
gies of their opponents. In the scenario where T is a set
of samples from a continuous distribution, the vast majority
of types may not be in T and have no incentive guarantee,
which is clearly undesirable. In settings where the agents’
types are single dimensional, Dobzinski, Fu, and Kleinberg
(2015) showed that “restricting the bidding language” does
turn any mechanism DSIC on T into a mechanism DSIC
on any superset of T : each type in the superset has a dom-
inant strategy, and by the revelation principle this gives rise
to a DSIC mechanism that extends the given mechanism’s
behavior on T . To the best of our knowledge, no such guar-
antees are known beyond single dimensional settings.
Our Results. For agents with multi-dimensional types, we
first give a condition under which any DSIC mechanism
on T can be extended to a DSIC mechanism on Conv(T ),
via an argument that is different from Dobzinski, Fu, and
Kleinberg’s yet still straightforward (Theorem 2). In partic-
ular, the condition is satisfied whenever the set of feasible
outcomes is downward closed (Theorem 1).
Our main result, however, is a construction of a set T of
multi-dimensional types and a DSIC mechanism on it, for
which we show that no DSIC mechanism on Conv(T ) can
output the same social outcomes on types in T . The impos-
sibility result stands even if the extension mechanism is al-
lowed to be randomized. This shows that, without conditions
such as single-dimensional types or downward closed set
of feasible outcomes, designing incentive compatible mech-
anisms by focusing on a discrete subset of types can be
a questionable approach to designing mechanisms for the
whole type space — there may not be any mechanism DSIC
on the whole type space which behave the same way on the
subset.
Near the end, we give a multi-dimensional setting where
the expected revenue of a mechanism with only correct in-
centives for a set T of types can be unboundedly more than
the revenue of a mechanism for Conv(T ). This example is
much less involved than our main result, because revenue
optimal mechanisms are meaningful only when they do not
overcharge any reported type and guarantee non-negative
utility. This constraint can be much more stringent when im-
posed for all types in Conv(T ) than for T only.
Related Works
For multi-dimensional preferences, an allocation rule for any
fixed agent is implementable if and only if it satisfies the
so-called cyclic monotonicity property (Rochet 1987). When
the type space is convex, it turns out the weaker condition of
weak monotonicity suffices for implementability (Saks and
Yu 2005; Archer and Kleinberg 2014). It is notable that the
two solution concepts we compare in Section precisely cor-
respond to the case where the type space is convex and that
where it is not. However, nowhere in our arguments do we
make use of this beautiful fact.
Another closely related body of work, is the literature
on automated mechanism design. In automated mechanism
design, mechanisms are optimized for the setting and ob-
jective automatically using information about agents’ type
distributions. When this work was introduced by Conitzer
and Sandholm (2002) the input for this problem was an ex-
plicit description of the agents distributions, however recent
work has moved towards replacing this explicit description
with samples from the agents type distribution (Likhode-
dov and Sandholm 2004; Likhodedov and Sandholm 2005;
Sandholm and Likhodedov 2015). Our work highlights how
interpolating between discrete samples can effect not only
the objective but the implementablility of the mechanism
itself. Luckily, the research on sample based automated
mechanism design is able to avoid the pitfalls of only
having discrete samples. They do this either by optimiz-
ing over parameterized families of mechanisms which are
guaranteed to be implementable on the entire typespace or
by working in settings where the addition of new types
has no effect on the objective (i.e. downward closed set-
tings, see Theorem 1)(Sandholm and Likhodedov 2015; Guo
and Conitzer 2010; Balcan, Sandholm, and Vitercik 2018;
Morgenstern and Roughgarden 2016). However, our work
points out some difficulties that might arise if one wishes
to take a more general, non-parameterized approach to au-
tomated mechanism design in settings which are not down-
ward closed.
There are a variety of well-studied settings that are not
downward closed in which extending a type space to its the
convex hull could cause problems. One commonly studied
not downward closed setting arises from the job schedul-
ing problem introduced in Nisan and Ronen (2001) and later
built upon by Chawla et al. (2013) and Ashlagi, Dobzin-
ski, and Lavi (2012). since in this problem every job must
eventually be scheduled and the set of feasible solutions is
not downward closed. Another example of a non-downward
closed setting is one-sided matching markets in which every
agent must be matched with exactly one good. An example
of a one-sided matching market is the fair housing allocation
studied by Abebe et al. (2019). Finally, the facility location
problem from Devanur, Mihail, and Vazirani (2005) also not
downward closed.
Preliminaries
We consider a setting with N agents where each agent i has
a private type ti from her type space Ti ⊆ Rm+ . The type
profile t = (t1, . . . , tN ) denotes the vector of all agents’
types, from the joint type space T :=
∏
i Ti.
We adopt the standard shorthand notation to write t−i :=
(t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tn) from T−i :=
∏
j 6=i Tj .
An outcome (or, interchangeably, allocation) for agent i
lies in Rm+ ; for an outcome xi, the agent with type ti has
value 〈ti, xi〉 =
∑m
j=1 tijxij . A social outcome is denoted
by a vector (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ RmN+ . The set of all feasible
social outcomes (or allocations) is denotedF ⊆ RmN+ .
For example, in a single-item auction, m = 1, each ti ∈
R+ represents agent i’s value for the item, and F ⊆ RN+
is the all zero vector (representing not selling) and the N
standard bases (each representing selling to a corresponding
agent). As another example, in a m-unit auction with unit-
demand buyers, F ⊆ RN+ is the set of all integral points in
{(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ RmN+ |
∑N
i=1 xij ≤ 1, j = 1, 2, . . . ,m}.
Mechanisms. A (direct revelation) mechanism consists
of an allocation rule x : T → F and a payment rule
p : T → RN+ . The mechanism elicits type reports from
the agents, and on reported type profile t, decides on an al-
location x(t) ∈ F , with each agent i making a payment
of pi(t). In general, allocation rules can be randomized, in
which case x(t) is a randomized variable supported on F .
x(·) induces allocation rule xi(·) for each agent i: for all t,
xi(t) ∈ Rm+ is the vector consisting of the [(i − 1)m + 1]-
st to the im-th coordinates in x(t). When x(t) is a random
variable, so are xi(t)’s.
When x(t) is deterministic, we write x(t) = y ∈ F as a
shorthand for Pr[x(t) = y] = 1.
Agents have quasi-linear utilities, that is, when reporting
type t′i, agent i’s utility is E[〈ti, xi(t′i, t−i)〉] − pi(t′i, t−i)
(where the expectation is taken over the randomness in x(t).
A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compati-
ble (DSIC) if, for all t ∈ T , and for all t′i ∈ Ti,
E[〈ti, xi(ti, t−i)〉] − pi(ti, t−i) ≥ E[〈ti, xi(t′i, t−i)〉] −
pi(t
′
i, t−i). An allocation rule x is said to be DSIC imple-
mentable or simply DSIC if there is a payment rule p such
that (x,p) is a DSIC mechanism. In this case, we say x is
implemented by payment rule p.
Extensions. Given a subset S ⊆ Rn, we denote by
Conv(S) the convex hull of S.
Definition 1. An allocation rule x˜ : Conv(T ) → F is
an extension of an allocation rule x : T → F if for all
t ∈ T , x˜(t) has the same distribution as x(t). Similarly,
a payment rule p˜ : Conv(T ) → RN+ is an extension of
payment rule p : T → RN+ if for all t ∈ T , p˜(t) = p(t).
In Definition 1, if x(·) is deterministic, then x˜(·) being an
extension simply means x˜(t) = x(t) for all t ∈ T .
Downward closed settings. The feasible allocation setF
is downward closed if y ∈ F entails x ∈ F for all x  y,
where x  y denotes xj ≤ yj for j = 1, · · · ,mN .
Weak monotonicity. A well-known necessary condition
for an allocation rule to be DSIC implementable is weak
monotonicity:
Definition 2. An allocation rule x : T → F is weakly
monotone if for each agent i, any ti, t′i ∈ Ti and t−i ∈ T−i,
E [〈ti − t′i, xi(ti, t−i)− xi(t′i, t−i)〉] ≥ 0.
Proposition 1 (see, e.g., Saks and Yu 2005). An allocation
rule is implementable only if it is weakly monotone.
In fact, Saks and Yu (2005) showed that, if T is con-
vex, then weak monotonicity is also a sufficient condition
for DSIC implementability.
Revenue. A mechanism (x,p) is ex post individually ra-
tional (IR) if for each agent i and for every t ∈ T ,
〈ti, xi(t)〉 − pi(t) ≥ 0.
Given a distribution D on T and a mechanism (x,p) that
is DSIC and ex post IR, the expected revenue of the mech-
anism is Et∼D[
∑
i pi(t)]. The optimal revenue is the maxi-
mum expected revenue achievable among all DSIC, ex post
IR mechanisms.
DSIC Convex Extensions
Before presenting our main result on the impossibility to ex-
tend DSIC allocation rules, we first complement Dobzinski,
Fu, and Kleinberg (2015)’s result in single-dimensional set-
ting with a simple observation in multi-dimensional pref-
erence settings: whenever the feasible allocation space is
downward closed, any DSIC allocation rule on a type space
can be extended to its convex hull by another DSIC alloca-
tion rule.
Theorem 1. If the set of feasible allocationsF is downward
closed, for any DSIC allocation rule x on a type space T ,
there is a DSIC extension x˜ of x on Conv(T ). If x is imple-
mented with a payment rule p, x˜ can be implemented by an
extension p˜ of p. If p is individually rational on T , so is p˜
on Conv(T ).
If we do not require the statement about individual ratio-
nality, extensibility is guaranteed by an even weaker condi-
tion, which we call single swap feasible.
Definition 3 (Single swap feasible). A feasible allocation
setF is single swap feasible (SSF) if for every agent i there
exists an allocation xssf(i) ∈ F such that for any x′ ∈ F ,
(x′i,x
ssf
−i(i)) ∈ F .
Intuitively, xssf(i) is a feasible allocation vector such that
if we replace the ith element of this vector with the ith ele-
ment from any other feasible allocation the resulting alloca-
tion is still feasible. IfF is a product space or is downward
closed, it must be SSF. 1
Theorem 2. If the set of feasible allocationsF is SSF, any
DSIC allocation rule x on a type space T , there is a DSIC
extension x˜ of x on Conv(T ).
The proofs for both Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 can be
found in the supplementary materials. The main result of
this paper is that without this condition a DSIC extension
may not exist.
Theorem 3. There is a two agent type space T rand with a
DSIC allocation rule xrand, such that xrand cannot be ex-
tended by a DSIC allocation rule to Conv(T rand).
We prove the theorem in two steps. We first present a set-
ting with three-dimensional preferences for which we show
the non-existence of deterministic extensions. We then build
on the construction, lifting it to a higher dimension, where
we strengthen the argument and show the non-existence of
extensions that even allow randomization.
Non-existence of deterministic extensions
We first present type space T det = T det1 ×T det2 and the alloca-
tion rule xdet, and then show that xdet is DSIC and yet can-
not be extended by any deterministic DSIC allocation rule
on Conv(T det).
The two agents have identical type spaces: for i = 1, 2,
T deti = T
det := {A = [1, 0, 0], B = [0, 1, 0], C =
[0, 0, 1], D = [ 13 ,
1
3 ,
1
3 ]}. A visual representation of this type-
space and its convex hull can be found in figure 1 in the sup-
plementary materials.
The allocation rule xdet is also symmetric, in the sense
that xdet1 (t1, t2) = x
det
2 (t2, t1) for any t1, t2 ∈ T det. We sum-
marize xdet1 with the diagram below. The rows are indexed by
agent 1’s own type V1, and the columns by agent 2’s type V2:
A B C D A [1, 1, 0] [2, 0, 2] [3, 0, 3] [4, 0, 4]B [0, 1, 1] [2, 2, 0] [3, 3, 0] [4, 4, 0]
C [1, 0, 1] [0, 2, 2] [0, 3, 3] [0, 4, 4]
D [0, 1, 1] [2, 2, 0] [3, 3, 0] [4, 4, 0]
The set of all feasible allocations is then F =
{(xdet1 (V1, V2), xdet2 (V1, V2))}V1,V2∈T det . We hasten to point
out that F is not the product between the two
agents’ respective set of feasible allocations. For example,
1To see that a downward closedF is SSF, observe that we can
let xssf(i) be the all zero vector for each agent i.
[1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0] is inF as it is xdet(A,A), but [1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1]
is not. This is important for the proof.
Proposition 2. xdet is DSIC implementable.
Proof. Let the payment be 0 for both agents and all type
profiles. As the allocation and payment rules are both sym-
metric, consider either agent i. If t−i = A, the maximum
value agent i could get, when her type isA,B, or C, is 1, at-
tained with truthful bidding. For ti = D, the four allocations
all give the same value 23 . Similar arguments hold when t−i
is B, C or D.
Theorem 4. There exists no deterministic DSIC extension
of xdet.
Before proving Theorem 4, we make several preparatory
observations.
A key difficulty with multi-dimensional preferences is the
the lack of a payment identity a` la Myerson (Myerson 1981).
In order to argue that any extension of an allocation rule is
not DSIC, one has to either check the many cyclic (or weak)
monotonicity conditions, or show that no payment rule can
support the extension in a DSIC mechanism. We designed
T det and xdet carefully so that the allocations “lock” the pay-
ment rules.
Lemma 1. For any allocation rule x˜ that is an extension
of xdet, if x˜ can be implemented by a DSIC mechanism
with payment rule p, then for any V ∈ {A,B,C,D},
p1(A, V ) = p1(B, V ) = p1(C, V ) = p1(D,V ), and
p2(V,A) = p2(V,B) = p2(V,C) = p2(V,D).
Proof. We prove the lemma for agent 1, and the statement
for agent 2 follows by symmetry.
By DSIC, for any V ∈ T det, we have
〈A, xdet1 (A, V )〉 − p1(A, V )
≥ 〈A, xdet1 (C, V )〉 − p1(C, V );
〈B, xdet1 (B, V )〉 − p1(B, V )
≥ 〈B, xdet1 (A, V )〉 − p1(A, V );
〈C, xdet1 (C, V )〉 − p1(C, V )
≥ 〈C, xdet1 (B, V )〉 − p1(B, V ).
Note that
〈A, xdet1 (A, V )〉 = 〈A, xdet1 (C, V )〉;
〈C, xdet1 (C, V )〉 = 〈C, xdet1 (B, V )〉;
〈B, xdet1 (B, V )〉 = 〈B, xdet1 (A, V )〉.
Therefore p1(A, V ) ≤ p1(C, V ) ≤ p1(B, V ) ≤ p1(A, V ).
Hence all inequalities are tight and we have p1(C, V ) =
p1(A, V ) = p1(B, V ).
For typeD’s payment, note that xdet1 (B, V ) = x
det
1 (D,V ).
If p1(B, V ) 6= p1(D,V ), one of B and D must be incen-
tivized to misreport the other type. Therefore p1(B, V ) =
p1(D,V ).
In figure 2 in the supplementary materials we give a 3
dimensional visualization of the agent’s value for each allo-
cation which gives intuition into the proof of lemma 1.
Lemma 2. If x˜ is a deterministic DSIC extension
of xdet, then for t1 = 13A +
1
3B +
1
3D, and any
V2 ∈ T det, x˜1(t1, V2) ∈ {x˜1(A, V2), x˜1(B, V2), x˜1(C, V2),
x˜1(D,V2)}.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume x˜ is a DSIC
extension of xdet, implementable by payment rule p, and
for t1 and V2 ∈ T det, x˜1(t1, V2) = xdet1 (V1, V ′2) for some
(V1, V
′
2) ∈ T det and V ′2 6= V2.
For any V2, one of xdet1 (A, V2) and x
det
1 (B, V2) gives an
equal positive value to bothA andB. Let V ∗1 be the type that
induces this equally valued allocation. (For example, if V2 =
B, then xdet1 (A,B) = [2, 0, 2] and x
det
1 (B,B) = [2, 2, 0].
Both A and B have the same value for xdet1 (B,B) and so
type B would be V ∗1 .)
Observe that, for the allocation xdet1 (V1, V
′
2), V1 has pos-
itive value 〈V1, xdet1 (V1, V ′2)〉, and no other type has higher
value for it. Therefore, type t1 has value at most 〈 23V1 +
1
3D,x
det
1 (V1, V
′
2)〉 for the allocation. In order for t1 to have
no incentive to misreport V ∗1 , we must have
〈2
3
V1 +
1
3
D,xdet1 (V1, V
′
2)〉 − p1(t1, V2)
≥ 〈2
3
V ∗1 +
1
3
D,xdet1 (V
∗
1 , V2)〉 − p1(V ∗1 , V2) (1)
On the other hand, in order for type V1 not to have incen-
tive for deviating to t1, we have
〈V1, xdet1 (V1, V2)〉 − p1(V1, V2)
= 〈V ∗1 , xdet1 (V ∗1 , V2)〉 − p1(V ∗1 , V2)
≥ 〈V1, xdet1 (V1, V ′2)〉 − p1(t1, V2); (2)
where for the equality we used the fact that the value ob-
tained by reporting truthfully is the same for every type
in {A,B,C} given a fixed type of the opponent, and that
p1(V1, V2) = p1(V
∗
1 , V2) by Lemma 1.
Similarly, in order for type D not to have incentive for
deviating to t1, we have
〈D,xdet1 (D,V2)〉 − p1(D,V2)
= 〈D,xdet1 (V ∗1 , V2)〉 − p1(V ∗1 , V2)
≥ 〈D,xdet1 (V1, V ′2)〉 − p1(t1, V2), (3)
where for the equality we used the fact that type D has the
same value for all allocations given a fixed type of the op-
ponent, and that p1(D,V2) = p1(V1, V2) by Lemma 1. Cru-
cially, (2) and (3) cannot both be tight, because by construc-
tion, for any V2 6= V ′2 ,
〈V1, xdet1 (V1, V2)− xdet1 (V1, V ′2)〉
=
3
2
〈D,xdet1 (D,V2)− xdet1 (V1, V ′2)〉 6= 0.
Therefore, 23 · (2) + 13 · (3) gives
〈2
3
V ∗1 +
1
3
D,xdet1 (V
∗
1 , V2)〉 − p1(V ∗1 , V2)
> 〈2
3
V1 +
1
3
D,xdet1 (V1, V
′
2)〉 − p1(t1, V2),
which contradicts (1).
By the same reasoning as for Lemma 1, the following
lemma follows from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3. If x˜ is a deterministic DSIC extension of xdet,
implementable by payment rule p, then for any t1 in the
interior of Conv(T det) and any V2 ∈ T det, p1(t1, V2) =
p1(A, V2).
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. Suppose x˜ is a deterministic DSIC ex-
tension of xdet. We show a contradiction by showing that x˜
must violate weak monotonicity.
Consider t1 = 13A +
1
3B +
1
3D and when agent 2’s type
is A. Since t1 could report any type in T det, she has as op-
tions xdet1 (A,A), x
det
1 (B,A), x
det
1 (C,A) and x
det
1 (D,A)}, all
at the same price by Lemma 3. By Lemma 2, these are also
all the allocations she could possibly get.
Since [1, 1, 0] is the only allocation for which both types
A and B have positive value, it is t1’s preferred alloca-
tion, i.e., x˜1(t1, A) must be [1, 1, 0]. This in turn implies
x˜2(t1, A) = [1, 1, 0]. (Recall that F is not a product space,
and the only allocation in which agent 1 gets [1, 1, 0] is
xdet(A,A) = [1, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0].)
Similarly, one can show x˜1(t1, D) = [4, 4, 0], which im-
plies x˜2(t1, D) = [2, 2, 0] or [4, 4, 0]. But in either case,
weak monotonicity is violated for agent 2’s types A and D.
For example, if x˜2(t1, D) = [2, 2, 0], we have
〈A, [1, 1, 0]〉+ 〈D, [2, 2, 0]〉 < 〈A, [2, 2, 0]〉+ 〈D, [1, 1, 0]〉.
Therefore, no deterministic DSIC extension of xdet is possi-
ble.
Non-existence of randomized extensions
We need a more convoluted construction and a more careful
argument to prove the impossibility of extensions that are
possibly randomized. We build on T det and xdet to construct
T rand and xrand and prove Theorem 3.
We first raise types in T det to a space of seven dimensions.
Define A′ = [1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0], B′ = [0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0],
C ′ = [0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0] andD′ = 13 (A
′+B′+C ′). For ease
of notation, we define a mapping det : {A′, B′, C ′, D′} →
T det, with det(A′) = A,det(B′) = B, det(C ′) =
C and det(D′) = D. We also introduce four new
types, E′ = [0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0], F ′ = [0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0],
G′ = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0] and H ′ = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]. Define
T rand = {A′, B′, C ′, D′, E′, F ′, G′}, and T rand = T rand ×
T rand.
We now define xrand, which is again symmetric, in the
sense that xrand1 (V1, V2) = x
rand
2 (V2, V1) for every V1, V2 ∈
T rand. We therefore only describe xrand1 . When both agents
report types in {A′, B′, C ′, D′}, the first three coordinates
of each agent’s allocation are given by xdet when fed by the
corresponding types in T det, and the remaining coordinates
are filled in according to the opponent’s report. More specif-
ically,
∀V1 ∈ {A′, B′, C ′, D′},
xrand1 (V1, A
′) = [xdet1 (det(V1), A), 0, 100, 100, 100],
xrand1 (V1, B
′) = [xdet1 (det(V1), B), 100, 0, 100, 100],
xrand1 (V1, C
′) = [xdet1 (det(V1), C), 100, 100, 0, 100],
xrand1 (V1, D
′) = [xdet1 (det(V1), D), 100, 100, 100, 0] (4)
For the other types, we have
∀V1 ∈ {E′, F ′, G′, H ′},∀V2 ∈ {A′, B′, C ′, D′},
xrand1 (V1, V2) = x
rand
1 (C
′, V2).
∀V2 ∈ {E′, F ′, G′, H ′},∀V1 ∈ T rand,
xrand1 (V1, V2) = [0, 0, 0, 100, 100, 100, 100].
Note that xrand itself is deterministic. The difficulty we
need to overcome in this section is that the extension of xrand
may be randomized, and we must show that any extension
to Conv(T rand) cannot be DSIC.
The set of feasible allocations is F =
{xrand(V1, V2)}V1,V2∈T rand . Again we emphasize that
the set of feasible allocations is not a product space.
We first show that a subset of the payments are still
“locked” as they were in the deterministic setting.
Lemma 4. For any allocation rule x˜ that is an extension of
xrand, if x˜ can be implemented by a DSIC mechanism with
payment rule p, then for any V ∈ {A′, B′, C ′, D′} and any
V ′, V ′′ ∈ T rand, p1(V ′, V ) = p1(V ′′, V ), and p2(V, V ′) =
p2(V, V
′′).
Proof. The proof for types in {A′, B′, C ′, D′} follows the
same steps as Lemma 1. For any type in {E′, F ′, G′, H ′}
note that they receive the same allocation as type C ′ and
therefore if they are charged a payment that is different from
the payment C ′ is charged than either C ′ or that type would
be incentivized to deviate.
In order to have a DSIC convex extension in this setting
we must satisfy a condition similar to lemma 2 with the
higher dimensional versions of the types from T det.
Lemma 5. If x˜ is a DSIC extension of xrand,
then for t1 = 13A
′ + 13B
′ + 13D
′, and any
V2 ∈ {A′, B′, C ′, D′}, x˜1(t1, V2) is supported on
{x˜1(A′, V2), x˜1(B′, V2), x˜1(C ′, V2), x˜1(D′, V2)}.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume x˜ is a DSIC
extension of xrand, implementable by payment rule p, and
for some V2 ∈ {A′, B′, C ′, D′},
there exist a pair of types V1, V ′2 such that
Pr[x˜(t1, V2) = x
rand(V1, V
′
2)] > 0 for a
V ′2 6= V2. Let XV2 denote the set of allocations{x˜1(A′, V2), x˜1(B′, V2), x˜1(C ′, V2), x˜1(D′, V2)}.
Let α = Pr[x˜1(t1, V2) ∈ XV2 ] and β = Pr[x˜1(t1, V2) 6∈
XV2 ]. Then by assumption, β > 0.
Also let x˜α1 (t1) = E[x˜1(t1, V2) | x˜1(t1, V2) ∈ XV2 ]
and x˜β1 (t1) = E[x˜1(t1, V2) | x˜1(t1, V2) 6∈ XV2 ]. Then
the expected value for agent 1 truthfully reporting t1 is
〈t1, αx˜α1 (t1) + βx˜β1 (t1)〉.
In order for x˜ to be DSIC, it must provide type t1 with at
least as much utility as it could receive from deviating to any
type in T rand.
Let Vmax ∈ argmaxV ′1∈T rand〈t1, xrand1 (V ′1 , V2))〉 then x˜
must satisfy the following DSIC constraint,
α〈t1, x˜α1 (t1)〉+ β〈t1, x˜β1 (t1)〉 − p1(t1, V2) ≥
〈t1, xrand1 (Vmax, V2))〉 − p1(Vmax, V2). (5)
We use this constraint to place an upper bound on p1(t1, V2).
By definition of Vmax,
〈t1, xrand1 (Vmax, V2))〉 ≥ 〈t1, x˜α1 (t1)〉.
Subtracting 〈t1, xrand1 (Vmax, V2))〉 from both sides of eq. (5)
and utilizing the fact that α+ β = 1 we have
β〈t1, x˜β1 (t1)〉 − β〈t1, xrand1 (Vmax, V2)〉
≥ p1(t1, V2)− p1(Vmax, V2).
Now using the fact that t1’s maximum difference in value
for any two allocations inF is upper bounded by 3, we get
3β + p1(Vmax, V2) ≥ p1(t1, V2). (6)
By construction, for V2 ∈ {A′, B′, C ′, D′}, there exists a
type Vnot ∈ {E′, F ′, G′, H ′} which has value 0 for every al-
location inXV2 . (For example if V2 = A
′ then all of the allo-
cations in {x˜1(A′, A′), x˜1(B′, A′), x˜1(C ′, A′), x˜1(D′, A′)}
have a 0 in the 4th coordinate and in this case Vnot = E′).
Now by Lemma 4, Vnot receives utility −p1(Vnot, V2) =
−p1(Vmax, V2) when reporting truthfully against opponent
type V2.
Therefore, in order to keep Vnot from deviating to type t1,
we must satisfy the following DSIC constraint,
−p1(Vmax, V2) ≥α〈Vnot, x˜α1 (t1)〉+ β〈Vnot, x˜β1 (t1)〉
− p1(t1, V2). (7)
Since x˜α1 (t1) is the expected allocation conditioned on the
resulting allocation being an element of XV2 , and Vnot has
zero value for any allocation inXV2 , we have 〈Vnot, x˜α1 〉 = 0.
Therefore,
p1(t1, V2) ≥ β〈Vnot, x˜β1 (t1)〉+ p1(Vmax, V2). (8)
Notice that for every allocation outside of XV2 the type
Vnot has value exactly 100 and therefore 〈Vnot, xβ(t)〉 = 100.
We now use this fact along with eq. (6) and eq. (8) and derive
the following contradiction,
3β + p1(Vmax, V2)− p1(Vmax, V2) ≥ β〈Vnot, xβ〉,
⇒ 3β ≥ 100β.
Since by assumption β > 0, this is a contradiction.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider t1 = 13A
′ + 13B
′ + 13D
′ and
assume Pr[x˜1(t1, A′) = xrand1 (A
′, A′)] < 1.
We know from Lemma 5 that x˜1(t1, A′) is supported
on {x˜1(A′, A′), x˜1(B′, A′), x˜1(C ′, A′), x˜1(D′, A′)}. Since
xrand1 (A
′, A′) is the only allocation for which bothA′ andB′
have positive value, t1 satisfies
∀V ′ 6= A′, 〈t1, xrand1 (V ′, A′)〉 < 〈t1, xrand1 (A′, A′)〉. (9)
But in order for t1 to have no incentive to report A′ when
agent 2’s type is A′, we have
E [〈t1, x˜1(t1, A′)〉]− p1(t1, A′) ≥
〈t1, xrand1 (A′, A′)〉 − p1(A′, A′).
Using eq. (9), we have
p1(A
′, A′) > p1(t1, A′). (10)
We now show that, similar to Lemma 3, a strictly lower pay-
ment for t1 as in Equation (10) would violate DSIC con-
straints. The DSIC constraint that keeps type D′ from devi-
ating to type t1 when the opponents type is A′ is
〈D′, xrand1 (D′, A′)〉 − p1(D′, A′)
≥ 〈D′, x˜1(t1, A′)〉 − p1(t1, A′). (11)
Since x˜1(t1, A′) is supported on {x˜1(A′, A′), x˜1(B′, A′),
x˜1(C
′, A′), x˜1(D′, A′)} and type D′ values all of these al-
locations equally we have
〈D′, x˜1(t1, A′)〉 = 〈D′, xrand1 (D′, A′)〉,
and by Lemma 4 we have p1(D′, A′) = p1(A′, A′). Using
these facts we write Equation (11) as
p1(t1, A
′) ≥ p1(A′, A′).
This contradicts Equation (10).
Therefore, x˜1(t1, A′) must be determinis-
tically xrand1 (A
′, A′). But the only allocation
in F with agent 1’s allocation being this is
xrand(A′, A′), and hence x˜2(t1, A′) is deterministically
[1, 1, 0, 0, 100, 100, 100]. Using the same argument, one
can show x˜1(t1, D′) = [4, 4, 0, 100, 100, 100, 0] with
probability 1, which implies x˜2(t1, D′) is supported on
{[2, 2, 0, 100, 0, 100, 100], [4, 4, 0, 100, 100, 100, 0]}. For
any allocation with this support, weak monotonicity is
violated for agent 2’s types A′ and D′.
Revenue Gap
In this section we explore the revenue gap between mech-
anisms that satisfy DSIC and IR on supp(D) and mecha-
nisms that satisfy DSIC and IR on Conv(supp(D)). Any
type that is in Conv(supp(D)) and not supp(D) occurs
with probability zero and does not itself contribute to the
revenue. It is therefore not obvious that enforcing constraints
on these additional types will impact revenue. In fact, Theo-
rem 1 shows that if the feasible set is downward closed there
is no gap in revenue between these two typespaces. How-
ever, for arbitrary feasibility sets, a gap can arise because not
every mechanism which is DSIC and IR can be extended to
Conv(supp(D)) without changing the payment rules on the
support. We show that for some feasibility sets and distri-
butions the gap in revenue between the optimal DSIC and
IR mechanism on supp(D) and the optimal mechanism on
Conv(supp(D)) is unbounded.
For a feasible set of allocations F and a distribution
D we, let OPT(F ,D) denote the optimal revenue ex-
tractable by a DSIC and IR mechanism on supp(D), and
let O˜PT(F ,D) denote the maximum revenue extractable
by a mechanism that is DSIC and IR on Conv(supp(D)).
We focus on the single agent case and show that the ratio
between OPT(F , D) and O˜PT(F , D) is unbounded.
Theorem 5. ∀α, there exists a feasible set F and distribu-
tion D such that OPT(F ,D) ≥ αO˜PT(F ,D).
Proof. Let ~1 be the ”all-ones” vector of length k and define
the set
S1 = {t ∈ Rk | ∃j s. t. tj = 1
and ∀h 6= j, th = 0}.
Intuitively, S1 is the set of all vectors of length k with exactly
one coordinate being 1 and the rest of the coordinates being
zero. We define the support, supp(D) = S1 ∪ ~1 and the set
of feasible allocationsF = S1.
We can show that OPT(F ,D) = 1 for any distribution
D that shares this support. This is obtained by giving each
t ∈ S1 an allocation x equal to their type i.e. t = x(t) and
giving type t = ~1 any allocation in the feasible set. We can
now charge a payment of 1 to every type.
Without loss of generality assume α > 1. Now for any
α define  < 1α and consider the distribution where Pr[t =
~1] = 1 −  and Pr[t 6= ~1] = . One of the types con-
tained inConv(supp(D)) is tk = [ 1k ,
1
k . . .
1
k ]. t
k has a value
of 1k for every feasible allocation and every lottery of ex-
isting allocations, therefore the maximum payment we can
charge without violating IR constraints is 1k . However, the
all ones type has value 1 for every feasible allocation and
can now gain utility of k−1k by deviating to type t
k. There-
fore to maintain incentive compatibility we must lower the
price we charge the all ones type to 1k (as well as the pay-
ment charged to one of the types S1). Therefore the revenue
generated on the convex hull if we take k to be large is,
O˜PT(F ,D) ≤ limk→∞(1− )( 1k ) +  ≤ 1α .
Conclusion and Future Work
We presented a DSIC mechanism on a discrete type space
which cannot be implemented if DSIC is required on the
convex hull of its type space. Extension from discrete to
convex domains is a common step in automated mechanism
design, and it is unfortunate that, as an implication of our
result, there exists no general procedure for extending an ar-
bitrary DSIC mechanism to the convex hull of its domain.
However, as we showed, such extensions are possible in spe-
cific settings, with special type spaces (e.g. single dimen-
sional) or special feasible set of allocations (e.g. downward
closed or, more generally, single swap feasible). Other suffi-
cient conditions for extensibility should be useful to have.
Another possibility we leave open is conditions on an al-
location rule (rather than the type space or the set of feasible
allocations) that would guarantee its extensibility. We know
that an allocation rule is DSIC implementable if and only
if it is cyclic monotone. Is there a condition stronger than
cyclic monotonicity which guarantees both implementabil-
ity and extensibility?
The mechanism we constructed for the impossibility re-
sult is intricate. A third question we leave open is whether
one may find a succinct property that is necessary for exten-
sibility; in other words, is there a natural condition whose
violation must result in inextensible mechanisms?
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Supplementary Material
Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. For ease of notation let ~0 represent the “zero-
allocation” (i.e. an all-zeros vector of length m). We now
give, for any DSIC and IR (x,p), an extended allocation
rule x˜ and extended payment rule p˜ that are DSIC and IR.
Whenever the reported type profile t contains only types
from the original typespace T (i.e. t ∈ T ) then by defini-
tion our extended allocation rule is x˜(t) = x(t) and our
extended payment rule is p˜(t) = p(t).
If exactly one agent i has a type ti ∈ Conv(Ti) \ Ti and
their opponents have types t−i ∈ T−i, then agent i’s al-
location is the same allocation as either the type tmaxi =
argmaxt′i∈Ti〈ti, xi(t′i, t−i)〉 − pi(t′i, t−i)〉 or the “zero-
allocation”, whichever provides more utility. More formally,
if ti ∈ Conv(Ti) \ Ti and t−i ∈ T−i, the extended alloca-
tion rule for ti is
x˜i(ti, t−i) =

xi(t
max
i , t−i),
if 〈ti, xi(tmaxi , t−i)〉−pi(tmaxi , t−i) ≥ 0;
~0, otherwise;
and the extended payment rule is
p˜i(ti, t−i) =

pi(t
max
i , t−i),
if 〈ti, xi(tmaxi , t−i)〉−pi(tmaxi , t−i) ≥ 0;
0, otherwise.
All other agents j 6= i are given the “zero-allocation”
and charged a payment of 0 (i.e. x˜j(tj , t−j) = ~0 and
p˜j(tj , t−j) = 0).
The allocation is feasible since x(tmaxi , t−i) ∈ F and F
is downward closed.
Finally if more than one agent has a type which is not
in the original typespace then ∀i, x˜i(ti, t−i) = ~0 and
p˜i(ti, t−i) = 0.
It remains to be shown that x˜ and p˜ are DSIC and IR. To
see that x˜ and p˜ are IR observe that every “new” allocation
and payment that are not zero are only chosen if they provide
non-negative utility and since the “zero-allocation” with a
payment of 0 by definition provides 0 utility, x˜ must satisfy
IR constraints.
We now show that x˜ and p˜ satisfy DSIC constraints.
For any agent i if they have an opponent j who reports
tj ∈ Conv(Tj)\Tj then agent i is given the zero-allocation,
regardless of their reported type. Therefore, we trivially sat-
isfy DSIC constraints whenever an opponent type profile
contains a “new” type.
When t−i ∈ T−i we must show that agent i has no incen-
tive to deviate, both when they have a “old” type and when
they have an “new” type. For an “old” type ti ∈ Ti, deviat-
ing to some type t′i ∈ Conv(Ti) \ Ti gives either the same
utility as deviating to tmaxi = argmaxt′′i ∈Ti〈t′i, xi(t′′i , t−i)〉−
pi(t
′′
i , t−i) or utility 0. Since (x,p) is DSIC and IR, this de-
viation cannot provide higher utility than 〈ti, x˜i(ti, t−i)〉 −
p˜i(ti, t−i). Finally, for a “new” type ti ∈ Conv(Ti) \ Ti, by
definition of x˜, the agent by reporting truthfully is given the
allocation and payment that maximizes utility over all possi-
ble deviations in Ti; by the logic above, this maximizes util-
ity over all possible deviations in Conv(Ti) as well. There-
fore, the agent has no incentive to deviate.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. This proof follows the same steps as the proof of
Theorem 1, with swap feasible allocations now playing the
role that ”zero-allocations” played in Theorem 1. Recall that
a swap allocation for agent i, denoted xssf(i), is a feasible
allocation vector with the property that if we replace the ith
component of this vector with the ith component from any
other feasible allocation, the resulting allocation is still fea-
sible.
For any DSIC (x,p) on T , We give a DSIC extension
(x˜, p˜) on Conv(T ).
Whenever the reported type profile t contains only types
from the original typespace T (i.e. t ∈ T ), x˜(t) = x(t) and
p˜(t) = p(t), as required by definition of an extension.
If only one agent i has a type ti ∈ Conv(Ti) \
Ti and their opponents have types t−i ∈ T−i, then
agent i is given the same allocation as the type tmaxi =
argmaxt′i∈Ti〈ti, xi(t′i, t−i)〉 − pi(t′i, t−i)〉. More formally,
for ti ∈ Conv(Ti) \ Ti and t−i ∈ T−i, the extended al-
location rule for ti is x˜i(ti, t−i) = xi(tmaxi , t−i) and the
extended payment rule is p˜i(ti, t−i) = pi(tmaxi , t−i).
The allocations for the remaining agents are described by
agent i’s swap feasible allocation, and are charged a pay-
ment of 0. Formally, ∀j 6= i, x˜j(tj , t−j) = xssfj (i) and
p˜j(tj , t−j) = 0.
By definition of single swap feasibility, regardless of the
value of x˜i(ti, t−i), (x˜i(ti, t−i),xssf−i(i)) remains feasible.
Finally, if a (reported) type profile t has more than one
agent with a type not in the original typespace, among agents
whose types are not within their original typespaces, let j
and k be the smallest and second smallest indices among
them. The extended allocation for such a type profile t is
x˜(t) = (xssfj (k),x
ssf
−j(j)) and ∀i, p˜i(t) = 0. In other words,
every agent’s allocation is determined by the swap allocation
of agent j, except agent j himself, whose allocation is given
by the swap allocation of agent k. Since this allocation only
changes the jth component of xssf(j), it is feasible by defi-
nition of SSF.
It remains to show that (x˜, p˜) is DSIC. First we deal with
the case where an agent i has at least one opponent whose
type is not in the original type space. Let j be the smallest
index of such an opponent. Then agent i is given xssfi (j) re-
gardless of their reported type. Therefore we trivially satisfy
DSIC when an opponent type profile contains a “new” type.
When t−i ∈ T−i we must show that any agent i has no
incentive to deviate, both when they have an “old” type and
when they have an “new” type. For an “old” type ti ∈ Ti,
deviating to some type t′i ∈ Conv(Ti) \ Ti gives the same
utility as deviating to tmaxi = argmaxt′′i ∈Ti〈t′i, xi(t′′i , t−i)〉−
pi(t
′′
i , t−i). Since (x,p) is DSIC, such a deviation cannot
provide higher utility than 〈ti, x˜i(ti, t−i)〉 − p˜i(ti, t−i). Fi-
nally, if ti ∈ Conv(Ti) \ Ti, then by definition of x˜, by
reporting truthfully the agent is given the allocation and pay-
ment that maximizes their utility over all possible deviations
in Ti; by the logic above, this maximizes utility over all pos-
sible deviations in Conv(Ti) as well. Therefore, the agent
has no incentive to deviate.
Figure 1: The maximum value for allocations in xdet1 for all types in Conv(T
det
1 ) . Each plot (visually an upside-down hollow
pyramid) represents a reported type for agent 2. From left to right these represent agent 2’s type being A, B or C (t2 = D is
omitted). Within each plot, or set of planes, the color represents the type in T deti agent 1 should report to receive the highest value.
The green plane represents t1 = A, the blue plane represents t1 = B and the red plane represents t1 = C. For example, the
green plane in the first set of planes represents the value from allocation xdet1 (A,A). From this image we can gain the intuition
behind the “locked” payments by re-imagining these planes as describing utility when payments are zero. We can think about
changes in payments as vertical shifts in the planes. For example, changing pdet1 (A,A) would shift the plane corresponding to
xdet1 (A,A). This would either cause it to fall below the red plane at the point A giving A incentive to deviate to type B or cause
it to rise above the blue plane at point B giving B an incentive to deviate to type A.
Figure 2: The typespace Conv(T det) projected to a 2 dimensional plane. The types in T det are labeled.
